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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PREJUDICIAL ERROR
WHEN IT GRANTED SUPERIOR'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
POINT I
CONTRARY TO SUPERIOR'S ASSERTION, THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF
MATERIAL FACT PRESENT IN THIS CASE WHICH PRECLUDED THE TRIAL
COURT FROM GRANTING SUPERIOR'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
A. THERE IS NO ISSUE OF FACT AS TO THE AMOUNT OF THE
PRINCIPAL CHARGE BY INTERWEST ANESTHESIA. HOWEVER
THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO HOW MUCH,
IF ANY MR. PETT STILL OWE INTERWEST FOR THE ANESTHESIA
SERVICES PROVIDED BY INTERWEST.
Although there is no dispute that Interwest initially charged $572.00 for anesthesia
services it provided on behalf of Mr. Pett's daughter, there is a genuine issue of fact as to
how much of that original billing, if any, is still owed. That issue of fact is created by
Superior's own documents.
On page 7 of its brief Superior admits that its own complaint creates an issue of fact
as to the amount, if any, Mr. Pert owes or owed for the anesthesia services provided to his
daughter. On page 7 of its brief Superior states as follows:
Mr. Pett points to two figures he says stand in contradiction to this amount. In the
complaint, the itemization of amounts owed listed $627.04 as "unpaid principal." R.5
Superior then goes on to make the following ridiculous statement: "The complaint was not
verified, and so is not evidence on which a genuine conflict may be supported." Superior
obviously has never read, or does not understand, the provisions of 56 URCP with respect to
motions for summary judgment.
In pertinent part, URCP 56(c) specifically provides:
-1-

The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. (Emphasis added).
Contrary to Superior's assertion there is no requirement that a complaint be verified in
order for its contents to create a genuine issue of material fact. Therefore, Superior's own
pleadings, and its own records, create a genuine issue of material fact as to the amount, if
any, Mr. Pett owes or owed to Superior, and that genuine issue of material fact precluded the
trial court from granting Superior's motion for summary judgment.
Superior attempts to negate this disputation of fact by having its counsel testify. On
page 8 of its memorandum Superior states as follows:
In preparing this brief counsel noticed that the judgment incorrectly carried forward
the extra $55.04 in principle. Superior stipulates to correction of the judgment so the
principal is reduced to $527.00. With corresponding reduction in interest and the
total judgment.l
Not only is Superior's counsel impermissibly testifying in Superior's appeal brief,
Superior and its counsel are impermissibly attempting to change the record ex post facto on
appeal.
Superior and its counsel's attempt to change the record ex post facto is not
permissible, and does not change the fact that Superior's own documents evidence a genuine
issue of material fact as to the amount, if any, Mr. Pett owes, or owed, to Interwest.
Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it granted Superior's motion for
summary judgment.

1. Thus Superior admits that the judgment entered by the trial court is incorrect, invalid and must
be vacated.
-2-

Furthermore, Superior does not even attempt to explain or rationalize the fact that
Exhibit A, attached to the affidavit of Windy Gittins, Superior filed in support of its motion
for summary judgment, claims that only $317.57 was allegedly transferred to Superior for
collection. (Record at 34).
Superior cannot have it all three ways. Superior cannot claim that Gittins affidavit
established as a matter of undisputed fact that $572.00 is the amount of Mr. Petfs alleged
obligation to Interwest, (Record at 30), next claims that its complaint establishes as a matter
of fact that the undisputed amount of Mr. Petfs alleged obligation to it is $627.04, allegedly
representing the "Unpaid Principal, " (Record at 6), and then also claim that Exhibit A,
attached to the of Gittins, establishes as an undisputed matter of fact that the amount Mr. Pett
allegedly owes Superior is $317.57. (Record at 34).
Because Superior has alleged in its own documents that Mr. Pett owes three different
amounts, for the anesthesia service provided on his behalf, there is a genuine issue of
material fact as to how much, if any, Mr. Pett owes Superior or anyone else for any
anesthesia services provided on his behalf. Ergo, Superior's assertion that it is undisputed
that the principal balance Mr. Pett allegedly owed to Superior or anyone else at the time
Superior filed its motion for summary judgment is in fact $572.00 is not undisputed that
Superior falsely claims.

B. THE FACT THAT $317.57 WAS ALLEGEDLY ADDED TO ANY ALLEGED
PRINCIPAL BALANCE OWED BY MR PETT TO SUPERIOR OR
ANYONE ELSE AS A COLLECTION CHARGE IS SPECIFICALLY
DISPUTED BY SUPERIORS OWN DOCUMENTS.
Once again, Superior's own documents are contradictory. While Gittins affidavit may
-3-

very well claim a collection charge was added to Mr. Pett's account in the amount of
$317.57, prior to the time Interwest referred Mr. Pett's account to Superior, and though
Gittins may also testify that the principal amount owed by Mr. Pett was $572.00, Exhibit A,
attached to her affidavit, clearly and unequivocally states that $317.57 was transferred to
Superior for collection $572.00, not $635.14 and not $952.71.2 Therefore, Superior's own
documents created issue of fact as to what the $317.57 was for as well as the amount of Mr.
Pett's alleged debt to Interwest, that Interwest allegedly transferred to Superior for collection.
Superiors counsel again attempts to testify and give his interpretation of what the
various entries contained on Exhibit A to Gittins affidavit mean or indicate. However, once
again, it is inappropriate for Superior's counsel to testify on appeal as to what he thinks the
entries may or may not mean, when there is nothing in the record indicating what these
entries all are.

C. CONTRARY TO SUPERIORS ASSERTION, WHETHER OR NOT THE
ALTIUS PAYMENT WAS RESCINDED BY ALTIUS IS SPECIFICALLY
AND STRENUOUSLY DISPUTED.
Contrary to Superior's assertion, there is a strenuous dispute as to whether or not the
Altius payment to Interwest was rescinded by Altius.
In Point C of its brief, Superior makes the following statement:
Superior supplied evidence that Mr. Pett's insurer, Altius made a payment to
Interwest of $334.62 on July 12, 2004. There was also direct testimony as well as a
business record, evidence Interwestfs refund of the $334.62 to Altius with the

The $317 57 is the last entry on Exhibit A, and it specifically states that $317.57 was the amount of
Mr. Pett's alleged debt that was transferred to Superior for collection.
-4-

consequent reversal of the previous credit. (Emphasis added). (Superior's brief, page
9, 1 2).
Those assertions are simply not true.
Gittins affidavit is not direct testimony evidencing that either Altius made a payment
to Interwest of $334.62 on July 12, 2004 or of "Interwest's refund of the $334.62 to Altius."3
Gittins does not claim to have personal knowledge of any payments made by Altius to
Interwest. Therefore, any assertions in her affidavit are not based on personal knowledge
and are not direct testimony as Superior falsely claims.4
Furthermore, as established in Mr. Pett's Opening Brief, Exhibit A to Gittins affidavit
is not a business record, as Superior falsely claims, but rather it is simply a document created
3

In it's memorandum to the trial court, Superior first claimed that Altius simply took the alleged
payment out of Interwest's account. In its memorandum in support of its motion for summary
judgment Superior states:
On or about July 12, 2004 the Defendant's insurance company, Altius, sent a payment, in the
amount of $334.62 to Interwest Anesthesia. (Record at 24, \ 9).
However, Altius retracted that payment on July 31. 2005. because on or about February 25.
2005. Altius paid the Defendant $514.80. to pay for the services and supplies provided by
Interwest Anesthesia to the Defendant's daughter on or about May 27, 2004. (Emphasis
added). (Record at 24, U 10).
Then, Superior claimed Altius offset the amount of the alleged payment against moneys owed
Interwest for services provided to a different insured. In its reply memorandum in support of its
motion for summary judgment, Superior makes the following ludicrous statement: "Is it that unusual
of a concept that if Interwest did not send a refund check to Altius that Altius would of set the
amount against another account. " (Record at 62).
At no time, in the trial court, did Superior ever claim that Interwest refunded any money to Altius it
received for services rendered on behalf of Mr. Pett.
4

In paragraph 3, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "Based upon my personal knowledge, memory, and
review of the Defendant \s account in this matter. I have determined the following" (Record, at 31).
(Emphasis added).
-5-

for purpose of litigation. Even the most cursory examination of Exhibit A, termed a
"Patient Ledger Analysis, " shows that the entries in Exhibit A are not in chronological
order. The last four entries on page two of Exhibit A are dated 6/10/2004, 7/12/2004,
9/1/2004, and 10/1/2005. Those entries follow twelve entries in 2005, on page one of
Exhibit A, ending with the last entry on 9/1/2005. If Exhibit A was a real business record,
prepared by Interwest at the time the entries allegedly made, and kept in the ordinary course
of business, as required for document to be admissible as a business record under the Utah
rules of evidence, the entries on Exhibit A would be in chronological order. The fact that the
entries are not in chronological order clearly establishes that Exhibit A is a document created
expressly for purposes of litigation, rather than a document that is prepared and kept in the
ordinary course of business. Therefore, it is not a business record as defined by 803(6) URE.
In order for documents to qualify as a business record under the Rule 803 (6) URE
URE, the proponent of the document must establish that document was:
made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it
was the regular practice of thai business activity to make the memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other
qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12).
Or a statute permitting certification.
In the case of the alleged refund to Altius, Gittins does not testify that she has
personal knowledge that the refund was made, that she personally made the refund, that it
was her job to supervise any such refunds or that she was present when others made the
alleged refund. Exhibit A to Gittins affidavit is clearly not a document prepared in the
course of regular conducted business, because as previously established, the entries on the
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documents are not in chronological order, clearly establishing that the entries were not made
at or near the time the entries indicate that they were made and were not made as a part of
the regular practice of the business, as mandated Rule 803 (6) URE.
Again, if Exhibit A was a real business record, prepared by Interwest at the time the
entries allegedly were made and kept in the ordinary course of business, as required for
document to be admissible as a business record under the Rule 803 (6) URE, Exhibit A
would be in chronological order, and the fact that the entries are not clearly establishes that
Exhibit A is a document created expressly for purposes of litigation, rather than a document
that is prepared and kept in the ordinary course of business. Therefore, it is not a business
record, and it establishes nothing.
Furthermore, even assuming that Exhibit A could possibly construed to be a business
record, it is not properly authenticated under the provisions Rules 911 and 912 URE, as
mandated by Rule 803(6), and is therefore inadmissible to establish anything under the
provisions of the URE and could not properly be considered on Superior's motion for
summary judgment.
Superior specifically claims that Interwest refunded the alleged payment of $334.62
Altius paid to Interwest on Mr. Petfs behalf (Superior's brief, page 9. ^ 2), because Altius
made a direct payment to Mr. Pett in the amount of $514.80. (Record at page 24^f 10), Mr.
Pett specifically denied ever receiving any such payment, (Record at 53, ^ 13), and Superior
has not, and cannot, prove that he received any such payment. However, Superior asserts
that it is Mr. Pett's obligation to prove a negative, i.e., prove that he did not receive the
payment of $514.80 from Altius. Such assertion is absolute nonsense and contrary to all
-7-

legal and logical principles. A person cannot prove a negative, and is never required to do
so.
Likewise, in its statement of facts of its brief, Superior made a similar ridiculous
assertion. On page 5 paragraph 2 of its brief Superior states as follows: "Mr. Pett did not
provide any evidence that Altius did or did not pay $334.62 to Interwest or that Interwest did
or did not return the $334.60 payment to Altius." Again, Superior is asserting that Mr. Pett
should be required to prove a negative, i.e., that Altius did not pay $334.62 to Interwest and
that Interwest did not return the payment of $334.62 to Altius. However, it is again
Superior's obligation to prove the fact Interwest refunded the payment of $334.62 to
Interwest, that Altius retracted the payment of the $334.62 or that Altius offset the $336.62
against money it owed Interwest for service provided by Interwest to another Altius insured.
It is not Mr. Pett's obligation to prove the negative of those contradictory assertions, i.e., that
Altius did not retract the payment of the $334.62 or did not offset the $336.62 against
money it owed Interwest for service provided by Interwest to another Altius insured, which
he can never do.
Although in its brief to this Court, Superior claims that it refunded the $334.62 to
Altius, (Superior's brief, page 9. ^ 2), in his pleadings and memoranda before the trial court,
Superior claims that Altius simply withdrew the alleged payment of the $334.62 from the
Interwest account. (Record at Page 24, ^f 10). However when challenged on the assertion
that Altius could in fact withdrawn any money from Interwest account, much less withdrew
any money more than a year after Interwest claims the payment was made, Superior made the
inane assertion that Altius simply offset the $334.62 payment, it made on behalf of Mr. Pett,
-8-

from money owed to Interwest for service provided to other Altius insured. (Record at page
63, If 4). But of course, Superior did not provide any documentation, of any nature
whatsoever, evidencing its inane assertion that Altius offset the $334.62 Interwest received
for payment on Mr. Pett's behalf from payments due for any other customer, client or account
of Interwest. It did not do so, and cannot do so, because Altius did not, and could not go into
any of Interwest accounts and withdraw money. Nor, could Altius legally offset any
payment made to Interwest on Mr. Pett's behalf against any money, owed Interwest, for
services provide for, or on behalf of, any other Altius insured for which Altius was obligated
to make payment to Interwest. Superior's assertion to the contrary is so ridiculous, at best it
violates the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct's requirement of candor and honesty to the
court, and is perhaps even afraudon the court.
Superior next makes the assertion that because it claims it "refunded" the $334.62
Altius paid to it on July 31, 2005, and that the reason for the alleged refund is relevant.
(Superiors brief, page 10, paragraph 1). However, as with many other of Superior's
assertions, that assertion is both factually and legally incorrect.
In paragraph 10 of its statement of fact contained in its memorandum of points and
authorities in support of its motion for summary judgment, Superior makes the following
assertion:
10. However, Altius retracted that payment on July 31, 2005 because on or about
February 25, 2005 Aldus paid $514.80 to the defendant pay for the services and
supplies provided by interest anesthesia to the defendant's daughter on or about May
2Z Please see the affidavit of Wendy Gittins. (Record at 24). (Emphasis added).
Because Superior specifically states that Altius "retracted' the payment of $334.62 it
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made to Interwest on or about July 12, 2004, for the reason that Altius allegedly made a
payment to Mr. Pett of $514.80 on February 25, 2005, whether or not Altius ever made any
such payment to Mr. Pett is directly relevant and controlling as to whether or not Altius ever
"retracted" the $334.62 payment it made to Interwest.
If Altius never made any payment to Mr. Pett in the amount of $514.80 on February
25, 2005, as Superior asserts, then it logically follows that Altius did not retract the payment
of $334.62 it made to Interwest on July 12, 2004 either. According to Superiors bwn
statement of facts, made in support of its motion for summary judgment, the only reason
Altius allegedly "retracted" the $334.62 payment to Interwest was because Altius made a
payment of $514.80 to Mr. Pett on February 25, 2005.
Superior has not, and cannot, produce any evidence supporting its bogus assertion that
Altius in fact made a payment to Mr. Pett in the amount of $514.80 on February 25, 2005.
Because Superior claims that Altius only "retracted" the payment of the $334.62 it made to
Interwest on July 12, 2004 because Altius paid Mr. Pett $514.80 on February 25, 2005,
because Superior canndt produce any evidence supporting its assertion that Altius ever paid
Mr. Pett $514.80 on February 25, 2005, because Superior has not and cannot produce any
documentation showing that Altius ever "retracted" the payment of $334.62 it made to
Interwest on July 24, 2004, because Superior has not and cannot provide any evidence
showing that it ever "refunded" the $334.62 Altius paid it on July 12, 2004, and because
Superior has not, and cannot, produce any evidence supporting its inane assertion that Altius
simply offset the payment of the $334.62 against money it owed to Interwest for services
allegedly provided by Interwest to other Altius ensured, there is a genuine issue of material
-10-

fact as to whether or not the $334.62 Altius paid to Interwest on July 12, 2004 was ever
refunded to Altius, retracted by Altius or offset by Altius against monies owed to Interwest
on behalf of other Altius ensured.
Because there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether or not the $334.62 Altius paid to
Interwest on Mr. Petfs behalf was ever "retracted" by Altius, "refunded" to Altius, or offset
by Altius, there is a genuine issue of material fact to how much, if any, Mr. Pett owed or
owes to Interwest. Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law and committed
prejudicial and reversible error when it granted Superior's motion for summary judgment.

POINT II
SUPERIOR IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW.
A. WHETHER OR NOT MR. PETT HAD ANY CONTRACTUAL DUTIES TO
INTERWEST IS IRRELEVANT. HE HAD NO CONTRACTUAL DUTIES
TO SUPERIOR.
In subsection A, of Point II of its brief, Superior claims that Mr. Pett owed contractual
duties to Interwest and that Interwest is a third-party beneficiary to the Consent and
Conditions of the Treatment between Cache Valley Specialty Hospital and Mr. Pett.
However, in paragraph 2 page 11 of its brief, Superior admits that Mr. Pett was not in privity
of contract with Interwest.
Superior then argues that because paragraph 4 the Consent and Conditions of
Treatment, between Mr. Pett and Cache Valley Specialty Hospital, states:
/ am aware that the position services by radiologists, cardiologists, anesthesiologist
as well as medical surgical and emergency care are not billed by the hospital but are
billed separately. I understand that I am under the same obligation to those providers
as stated in this agreement in less otherwise agreed to in writing with those providers.
-11-

/ authorize payment of any medical benefits for such claims to the appropriate
provider.
Interwest is a third-party beneficiary of the contract between Cache Valley Specialty
Hospital and Mr. Pett.
However, whether or not Interwest is a third-party beneficiary of the contract between
Cache Valley Specialty Hospital and Mr. Pett is irrelevant to this case. Superior is not a
third-party beneficiary to the contract, and it is Superior who has sued Mr. Pett not Interwest.
Superior did not claim at the trial court level that it was a third-party beneficiary of
the contract between Cache Valley Specialty Hospital and Mr. Pett. Therefore, it cannot
now raise the issue of whether or not it is in fact a third-party beneficiary of the contract
between Cache Valley Specialty Hospital and Mr. Pett for the first time on appeal.
We do not address issues raisedfor the first time on appeal unless specific grounds
for doing so are presented to this court. Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist v. Spanish Fork
City, 918 P.2d 870, 880 (Utah 1996) (stating that with few limited exceptions, this
court will not consider issues raisedfor first time on appeal); Medical Products Inc.
v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228 (Utah 1998).5

B. SUPERIOR IS NOT ENTITLED TO INTEREST AT 18%, COURT
COSTS OR ATTORNEY1 S FEES IN CONNECTION WITH HIS
IMPROPER LAWSUIT AGAINST MR. PETT.
Because Superior did not notify Mr. Pett that any claim Interwest allegedly had
against him had been assigned to Superior, prior to Superior filing lawsuit against Mr. Pett,

5

If Interwest hadfiledsuit in its own name, or if Superior hadfiledsuit on behalf of Interwest, then
perhaps Superior could argue that Mr Pett owed contractual duties to Interwest in connection with
his lawsuit However, when Mr Pett's alleged debt to Interwest was assigned to Superior and
Superior opted to sue Mr Pett in its own name rather than on behalf the Interwest, any potential
contractual obligations Mr Pett may have had to Interwest became nonexistent with respect to
Superior
-12-

Superior is estopped to claim it is entitled to a court costs, interest at 18% and/or attorney's
fees in connection with the improper and unlawful suit against Mr. Pett.
Superior claims that because The Consent and Conditioned of Treatment contains a
provision for the payment of interest on any unpaid balance after 60 days, collection costs
and attorneys fees it is not required to give Mr. Pett notice of either Interwest's claim for the
services provided on his behalf or notice that any indebtedness for the services had been
assigned to Superior. That assertion is contrary to both state law and federal law.
As established in Mr. Pett's opening brief, under the express holding of Webb v.
BrinkerhoffConstr. Co, 972 P.2d 74 (Utah 1988), when a debt has been assigned, the party
to whom the debt has been assigned is required to give the debtor notice of the assignment
prior to instigating a lawsuit against the debtor. In Webb, the Utah Supreme Court
specifically held:
Notification to a debtor of an assignment of the debt is indispensable if the debtor is
to be held liable to the assignee. If the debt is to be discharged by payment to
someone other than the creditor because of that assignment, unambiguous
notification of the change must be given the debtor;
Superior seeks to limit that holding of Webb to only those cases in which a payment to
someone other than the assignee has been made, thus relieving the debtor from the obligation
of double payments. However, Webb is not so limited. Webb does not state that notice of
assignment is only required if the debtor has already made payment to someone other than
the assignee. Webb requires that notice of assignment must be given to a debtor before an
assignee seeks to enforce any debt against a debtor.
Furthermore, because Superior is a collection agency, it is governed by the provisions
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of The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Section 809 of that Act, 15 USC 1692g, mandates
that any person or entity covered under the provisions of The Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act not only provide a debtor notice that alleged debt has been assigned to the person or
entity for collection, but also within five days of the initial contact with the debtor, that the
debt collector must provided debtor with information showing: 1) the amount of the alleged
debt; 2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is allegedly owed; 3) a statement that
unless the debtor disputes the validity of the debt, within 30 days, it will be assumed to be
valid; 4) a statement that if the debtor notifies the debt collector in writing, within 30 days,
that the debt or any portion of it is disputed the debt collector will obtain verification of the
debt and mail a copy of the verification to the debtor; and 5) a statement that upon the
debtor's written request, the debt collector will provide the debtor name and address of the
original creditor if different from the current creditor.
Although Superior claims that Interwest sent Mr. Pett notices of the amount debt he
allegedly owed for services provided on his behalf, Superior did not attach any such notices
to its complaint, its memorandum in support of its motion for judgment or to reply
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment. Nor did Superior attach any
notices it allegedly sent Mr. Pett informing him of the assignment of the alleged debt to
Superior from Interwest, as required bu Wev and under the express provisions of Section 809
of The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 USC 1692g.
Mr. Pett stated in his Affidavit that he never received any bills or notices from either
Interwest or Superior, prior to Superior serving him with a summons and complaint in this
matter. (Record at 53, ]fs 10-11). If in fact either Interwest or Superior had sent Mr. Pett any
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notices of his alleged debt to Interwest or its assignment to Superior, it should have been a
simple matter to attach those notices, or a least one of those notices, not only to the
complaint, but also to Superior's memorandum in support of its motion for summary
judgment. And surely if those notices existed, Superior would have attached at least one of
those notices to its reply memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, after
it received Mr. Pett's Affidavit stating that he had never received any such notices from either
Interwest or Superior.
The fact that neither Superior nor Interwest have produced any documentation, of any
nature whatsoever, showing that Mr. Pett was ever aware of any alleged obligation to
Interwest prior to his receipt of the summons and complaint in this matter creates a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether any such notices were ever sent and precluded the trial
court from entering summary judgment in favor of Superior as well as awarding Superior
court costs, attorneys fees and interest at 18%.
Because Superior cannot produce any evidence, of any nature whatsoever,
establishing that it ever notified Mr. Pett that his alleged obligation to Interwest had been
assigned to Superior for collection, under both state and federal law, Superior is not entitled
to attorney's fees, collection costs or interest at 18% in connection with its unlawful and
improper suit against Mr. Pett.

C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND
COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PREJUDICIAL ERROR WHEN IT
WEIGHED THE FACTS ON SUPERIORS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
In response to Mr. Pett's assertion that the trial court committed reversible and
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prejudicial error when it weighed the facts on Superior's motion for summary judgment,
Superior simply states that trial court did not weigh the evidence. Superior does not even
attempt to address the ridiculous and illogical statements of the trial court contained in its
December 28, 2006 memorandum decision.
Superior has not done so, and is not attempted to do so, because the various
statements of the trial court, set forth in Mr. Pett's opening brief, demonstrate such a blatant
weighing of the facts that any attempt to construe the trial court statements as something
other than impermissible of an unlawful weighing of the facts is impossible.
Because it is impossible to read the trial court's December 28, 2006 memorandum
decision and concluded that the trial court did anytihdng other then engage in impermissible
and unlawful weighing of the facts, Superior was not entitled to summary judgment.
Therefore, this Court must reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
Superior.

R THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND
COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PREJUDICIAL ERROR WHEN IT
VIEWED THE ALLEGED EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE IN THE LIGHT
MOST FAVORABLE TO SUPERIOR.
In response to Mr. Pett's assertion that the trial court committed reversible and
prejudicial error when it viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to Superior when
ruling on Superior's motion for summary judgment, Superior, again, does not even attempt to
rebut that assertion. And once again, Superior does not even attempt to address the
ridiculous and illogical statements of the trial court contained in its December 28, 2006
memorandum decision, or dispute, in any logical or meaningful way, that the trial court
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viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to Superior. As with Mr. Pett's assertion that
rite trial court improperly and unlawfully weighed the evidence on Superior's summary
judgment motion, Superior has not done so, and is not attempted to do so, because the
various statements of the trial court, set forth in Mr. Pett's opening brief, demonstrate beyond
any doubt that the trial court impermissibly viewed all facts in the light most favorable to
Superior, and it is impossible for any logical, rational person to conclude the trial did
anything otherwise.
Because it is impossible to read the trial court's December 28, 2006 memorandum
decision and concluded that the trial court did anything other than view the facts in the light
most favorable to Superior, Superior was not entitled to summary judgment. Therefore, this
Court must reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Superior.

POINT ITT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF
WENDY GITTINS AND THEN RELIED ON HER AFFIDAVIT IN RULING ON
SUPERIOR'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Gittins affidavit is not based on personal knowledge, as required by Rule 56(e)
URCp. Therefore, the trial court was required to strike it, and not rely on it, when ruling on
Superior's morion for summary judgment.
The relevant portion of rule 56(e) states that "[supporting and opposing affidavits
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein. "Inadmissible evidence cannot be considered in
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, t> & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420,
421 (Utah 1989); Creekview Apartments v. State Farm Ins. Co., 771 P.2d693, 695
(Utah Ct.App 1989); so an affidavit which does not meet the requirements of rule
56(e) is subject to a motion to strike. Howick v. Bank of Salt Lake, 28 Utah 2d 64, 498
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P. 2d 352, 353-54 (1972); see also Blomquist, 504 P. 2d at 1020-21 (an affidavit
containing statements made only "on information and beliefr is insufficient and will
be disregarded). (Emphasis added).
Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 482 (Ut. App. 1990), see also. GNS Partnership v.
Fullmer, 873 P.2d 1157 (Ut. App. 1994).
Affidavits submitted in support or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment
must be based on the personal knowledge of the affiant and may not be considered by
the trial court if largely based on unsubstantiated opinions, conjecture, and beliefs.
See Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985) ("Under [rule] 56(e), an •
affidavit [based] on information and belief is insufficient to provoke a genuine issue
of fact."); Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983) ("[Statements in [an]
affidavit [that] are largely conclusory. . . would not be admissible in evidence and
may not be considered on summary judgment."); Walker v. Rocky Mountain Rec.
Corp., 29 Utah 2d274, 508 P.2d538, 542 (1973) ("Statements made merely on
information and belief will be disregarded. Hearsay and opinion testimony that would
not be admissible if testified to at the trial may not properly be set forth in an
affidavit.").
136 P.3d 1252; Brown v. Jorgensen; 2006 UT App. 168 (Emphasis added).
Superior claims that Mr. Pett's motion to strike the affidavit of Gittins was tflate and
inappropriate." Superior also claims that liunder rule 12(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
a motion to strike is made before responding to a pleading. " Superior further claims that
Mr. Pett's motion to strike the affidavit of Gittins came two weeks after his response to
Superior's motion for summary judgment and, therefore, was untimely under the rules.
Superior's memorandum, page 16, paragraph 3.
Superior's assertion that Mr. Pert was required to file a motion to strike Gittins
affidavit prior to filing a response to Superior's motion for summary judgment is either a
deliberate misrepresentation of a law, on the part of Superior, or evidence of Superior's total
lack of understanding of law with respect to motions to strike affidavits.
Motions to strike affidavits are governed by Rule 56 URCP, not Rule 12 URCP.
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Superior has not, and cannot, identify any of part of Rule 12 that states a motion to strike an
affidavit must be filed before party responds to motion for summary judgment. Likewise,
Superior has not, and cannot, site this court to any case law which holds the motion to strike
an affidavit must be made before a response is filed to motion for summary judgment. There
is simply no such requirement under Utah law.
Superior also claims that Gittins affidavit was based on personal knowledge and
"demonstrated the reliability of the business records which were attached among which the
testimony focused" That assertion is utter nonsense.
As previously established in this brief, Exhibit A to Gittins affidavit not only cannot
qualify as a business record, it is obviously a document that was created solely for the
purposes of this litigation. Therefore, the trial court was specifically prohibited from relying
on it or considering it, in any manner whatsoever, when ruling on Superior's motion for
summary judgment. See Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, GNS Partnership v. Fullmer and
Brown v. Jorgensen supra.
Additionally, Gitten's own affidavit establishes that the affidavit is not based on
personal knowledge. In paragraph 3, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "Based upon my
personal knowledge, memory, and review of the Defendant (s account in this matter. I have
determined the following" (Record, at 31). (Emphasis added). By making the statement "I
have determined the following" Gittins is unequivocally stating that everything in her
affidavit after paragraph 3 is something that she has simply determined, not that she knows,
^iot that she may remember, or even something that she believes, but something that she has
determined. Rule 56 does not permit affidavits to be based on a person s opinion,
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conclusions or determinations. See Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, GNS Partnership v.
Fullmer and Brown v. Jorgensen supra.
Because Gittins affidavit is not based on personal knowledge, as required by Rule 56
URCP, as a matter of law, the trial court was required to strike it. The affidavit was also
based on inadmissible hearsay and a document that was prepared solely for purposes of this
litigation and could not possibly be construed to be any sort of business record; therefore, the
trial court was required to strike it.
Because the trial court failed and refused to strike Gittins affidavit, and then relied on
her affidavit when ruling on Superior's motion for summary judgment, it erred as a matter of
law and committed prejudicial and reversible error when ruling on Superior's motion for
summary judgment. Therefore, as a matter of law, this Court must reverse the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of Superior.

POINT IV
SUPERIOR IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR OPPOSING MR.
PETTS APPEAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S IMPROPER AND UNLAWFUL
GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF SUPERIOR.

In Point IV of its brief, Superior asserts that it is entitled to attorney's fees in
conjunction with his opposition to Mr. Pett's appeal of the trial court's improper and unlawful
grant of summary judgment in favor of the Superior. Superior asserts that, because the trial
court awarded it attorney's fees in conjunction with his motion for summary judgment, it
should be awarded attorney's fees in this appellate proceeding. Superior further asserts that it
is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to a contractual provision, presumably The Consent and
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Conditions of Treatment. Superior's assertions are incorrect, both factually and legally.
First, The Consent and Conditions of Treatment is not a contractual agreement
between Mr. Pett and Superior, as Superior has admitted.6 Thus, Superior is not entitled to
an award of attorney fees pursuant to the terms of The Consent and Conditions of Treatment,
because if Interwest was not in privity of contract, as Superior has admitted, then Superior
who is allegedly Interwest's assignee cannot be in privity of contract with Mr. Pett either.
Additionally, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it granted Superior's motion
for summary judgment and awarded Superior attorney's fees in conjunction with that
summary judgment motion. As previously established in this Brief, Superior violated both
state and federal law when it initiated this lawsuit against Mr. Pett, without first notifying
him of any assignment from Interwest to Superior.
Because Superior violated both state and federal law when it initiated this lawsuit
against Mr. Pett, without first notifying him of any assignment from Interwest to Superior,
Superior was not entitled to summary judgment, at the trial court level, or to any award of
attorneys fees at the trial court level, and, therefore, it is not entitled to any attorney's fees
associated with his opposition to Mr. Pett's appeal of the trial court's unlawful and improper
grant of summary judgment in favor of Superior to this Court.
Because Superior did not comply with either the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or the
jUtah Rules of Evidence, when it filed its motion for summary judgment, its motion for
summary judgment was a violation of Rule 11 URCP and UCA 78-27-56. Therefore, the

6

. "Mr. Pett was not in privity of contract wit InterWest. " Superior's brief, page 11 ,<[[ 3.
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trial court could not possibly logically or legally grant Superior's motion for summary
judgment, and Superior was not entitled to any attorney's fees at the trial court level.
Consequently, Superior is not entitled to any attorney's fees on appeal.
Mr. Pett, however, should be awarded his costs and attorney's fees on appeal, pursuant
to the provisions of Rule 40 URAP, because Superior's opposition to Mr. Pett's appeal is
frivolous, disingenuous, spurious, and without any basis in fact or law.
Superior's initial failure to comply with the provisions of Rule 56 URCP when it filed
its motion for summary judgment, i.e., basing its motion for summary judgment on hearsay
documents, that it falsely asserted were business records, failing to include certified copies of
all documents on which it relied in the summary judgment motion, falsely claiming that a
document it prepared solely for this litigation was in fact a business record, submitting an
affidavit based on speculation conclusion and opinion, and falsely asserting claims which it
could not prove, and did not even attempt to prove, was a per se violation of Rule 11 URCP
as well as UCA 78-27-56.
Superior's continued representation to this Court that it's failure to comply with the
provisions of Rule 56 URCP when it filed its motion for summary judgment, i.e., basing its
motion for summary judgment on hearsay documents, that it falsely asserted were business
records, failing to include certified copies of all documents on which it relied in the summary
judgment motion, falsely claiming that a document it prepared solely for this litigation was in
fact a business record, submitting an affidavit based on speculation conclusion and opinion,
and falsely asserting claims which it could not prove, and did not even attempt to prove, is
justified and proper, is a per se violation of Rule 40 URAP. Therefore, pursuant to the
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provisions of Rule 40 URAP, Mr. Pett should be awarded his costs and fees associated with
prosecuting this appeal.

CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
The trial court erred, as a matter of law, and committed prejudicial and reversible
error when it granted Superior's motion for summary judgment. The trial court erred, as a
matter of law, and committed prejudicial and reversible error when it weighed disputed facts
in this case. The trial court erred, as a matter of law, and committed prejudicial and
reversible error when it viewed the disputed facts in this case in the light most favorable to
Superior. The trial court erred, as a matter of law, and committed prejudicial and reversible
error when it failed to strike the affidavit of Gittins. The trial court erred, as a matter of law,
and committed prejudicial and reversible error when it awarded court costs, interest at 18%
and attorney's fees to Superior.
Because the trial court erred, as a matter of law, and committed prejudicial and
reversible error when it granted Superior's motion for summary judgment, when it weighed
disputed facts in this case, when it viewed the disputed facts in this case in the light most
favorable to Superior, and when it awarded court costs, interest at 18% and attorney's fees to
Superior, this Court must, as a matter of law, reverse the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Superior. Therefore, Mr. Pett respectfully requests that this Court issue
an order reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Superior and
demand this matter back to the district court for further proceedings. Mr. Pett also resquests
that this Court award him his cost and attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting this appeal
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because Superior's opposition to Mr. Pett's appeal is a pers se violation of Rule 40 URAP, as
well as UCA §78-27-56.
Respectfully submitted this / ^ day of February 2008.
-->

/i

%^^^^^^^CCharles A. Schultz
Attorney for James E. Pett
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correct copes of the foregoing Brief to the person(s) at the address(es) below, by depositing a
copy(s) in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:

Jonathan P. Thomas
31 Federal Ave.
Logan, UT 84321

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for James E. Pett
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Sec. 1692g. Validation of debts
(a) Notice of debt; contents
Within five days after the initial communication with a consumerin connection with the
collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in
the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written
notice containing (1) the amount of the debt;
(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;
(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days
after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt,
or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by
the debt collector;
(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt
collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt,
or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will
obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against
the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be
mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and
(5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written request
within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the
consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if
different from the current creditor.
(b) Disputed debtslf the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the
thirty-day period described in subsection (a) of this section that the debt, or any portion
thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer requests the name and address of the original
creditor, the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof,
until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment, or the name
and address of the original creditor, and a copy of such verification or judgment, or name
and address of the original creditor, is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.
(c) Admission of liability
The failure of a consumer to dispute the validity of a debt under this section may not be
construed by any court as an admission of liability by the consumer.
EFFECTIVE DATE
Section applicable only with respect to debts for which the initial attempt to collect occurs
after the effective date of this subchapter, which takes effect upon the expiration of six
months after Sept. 20, 1977, see section 818 of Pub. L. 90-321, set out as a note under
section 1692 of this title.
Last modified: June 14, 2006
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after the effective date of this subchapter, which takes effect upon the expiration of six
months after Sept. 20, 1977, see section 818 of Pub. L. 90-321, set out as a note under
section 1692 of this title.
Last modified: June 14, 2006
78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or defense in bad faith — Exceptions.
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if
the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not
brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party under
Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before the court; or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the provisions of
Subsection (1).
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Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; representations to court;
sanctions.
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at least one
attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not represented by an
attorney, shall be signed by the party. Each paper shall state the signer's address and
telephone number, if any. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute,
pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be
stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to the
attention of the attorney or party.
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the
court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating), an attorney or
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,
(b)(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law
or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or
the establishment of new law;
(b)(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(b)(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so
identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines
that subdivision (bj has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated below,
impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated
subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.
(c)(1) How initiated.
(c)(1)(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately from
other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate
subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or
presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other period
as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or
denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the
party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred in
presenting or opposing the motion. In appropriate circumstances, a law firm may be held
jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners, members, and employees.
-3-

(c)(1)(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order describing
the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an attorney, law
firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto.
(c)(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be
limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by
others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the
sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a
penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order
directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other
expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.
(c)(2)(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a violation
of subdivision (b)(2).
(c)(2)(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless the court
issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made
by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
(c)(2)(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct determined
to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed.
(d) Inapplicability to discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do not apply to
disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are subject to the
provisions of Rules 26 through 37.
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Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a defendant shall
serve an answer within twenty days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete
within the state and within thirty days after service of the summons and complaint is complete
outside the state. A party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer thereto
within twenty days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply to a counterclaim in the answer
within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty
days after service of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this
rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the court, but a
motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading does not affect the time for responding
to the remaining claims:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the merits, the
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after notice of the court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading shall be served
within ten days after the service of the more definite statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if
one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3)
improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion
making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a
responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If a
pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive
pleading, the adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If,
on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by
the court, the motion shall be treated as one for-summary judgment and disposed of as provided in
Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent
to such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not
to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on
the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion
by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in subdivision (b) of this rule,
whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c)
of this rule shall be heard and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court
orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
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(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is
so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the
party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion
shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the
order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of the order or within such other time as
the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such
order as it deems just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no
responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within twenty days
after the service of the pleading, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may join with it the other
motions herein provided for and then available. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does
not include therein all defenses and objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by
motion, the party shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so
omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this ade.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by motion or
by answei or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a
legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for
judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears by
suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court
shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as
provided m Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received.
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the denial of any
motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of such motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action resides out of this
state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish
security for costs and charges which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and
determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the plaintiff to
file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for payment of such costs and charges
as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No security shall be required of any officer,
instrumentality, or agency of the United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the undertaking as ordered within
30 days of the service of the order, the court shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order
dismissing the action.
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Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to
obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the
adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment
as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character,
may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at
the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in
controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of
the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted
accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to
the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits
to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but
the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against a party failing to file such a response.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing
-7-

the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to
justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order
a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to
be had or may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the
party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which
the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending
party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
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Rule 40. Attorney's or party's certificate; sanctions and discipline.
(a) Attorney's or party's certificate. Every motion, brief, and other paper of a party
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record who is an active
member in good standing of the Bar of this state. The attorney shall sign his or her
individual name and give his or her business address, telephone number, and Utah State Bar
number. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign any motion, brief, or other
paper and state the party's address and telephone number. Except when otherwise
specifically provided by rule or statute, motions, briefs, or other papers need not be verified
or accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate
that the attorney or party has read the motion, brief, or other paper; that to the best of his or
her knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is not frivolous or
interposed for the purpose of delay as defined in Rule 33. If a motion, brief, or other paper is
not signed as required by this rule, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the
omission is called to the attention of the attorney or party. If a motion, brief, or other paper is
signed in violation of this rule, the authority and the procedures of the court provided by
Rule 33 shall apply.
(b) Sanctions and discipline of attorneys and parties. The court may, after reasonable notice
and an opportunity to show cause to the contrary, and upon hearing, if requested, take
appropriate action against any attorney or person who practices before it for inadequate
representation of a client, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar or a person allowed to
appear before the court, or for failure to comply with these rules or order of the court. Any
action to suspend or disbar a member of the Utah State Bar shall be referred to the Office of
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar.
(c) Rule does not affect contempt power. This rule shall not be construed to limit or impair
the court's inherent and statutory contempt powers.
(d) Appearance of counsel pro hac vice. An attorney who is licensed to practice before the
bar of another state or a foreign country but who is not a member of the Bar of this state,
may appear, pro hac vice upon motion, filed pursuant to the Code of Judicial Administration.
A separate motion is not required in the appellate court if the attorney has previously been
admitted pro hac vice in the lower tribunal, but the attorney shall file in the appellate court a
notice of appearance pro hac vice to that effect.
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Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial.
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as
a witness:
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made
while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter.
(2) Exciled utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the declarant's then
existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive,
design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or
belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation,
identification, or terms of declarant's will.
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements made for purposes
of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms,
pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof
insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness
once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully
and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh
in the witness' memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum
or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered
by an adverse party.
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, .or data compilation,
in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or
from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make
the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the
custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11), Rule
902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the source of information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in
this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of
every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
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274 N Main St
Logan, UT 84321-3915 USA
Patient Ledger Analysis
PETT
Init. Bal:

HEATHER
Ins. Bal: $ 0.00

$ 0.00

Patient#: 20,644
Pat. Bal: $ 952.71

Active Charges Only

Date of Birth: 9/16/1993
Phone: (435)512-1821
Total Bal: $952.71
SSN:

Charge Seq. #:

66,006

Primary: ALTIUS

ALTIUS

Secondary:

Charge Amount:

$ 572.00

P. Status:* Resolved

S. Status:

Attending Physician: JRR

Trans. Date: 5/27/200

Mod ICD#

Charges Days or Units

tem# From

To

POS CPT#

Procedure Description

Charge Balance: $635.14
Vans. Date5/27/2004
Trans. Seq. #: 66006
5/27/2004

5/27/2004

22

00170

Amt:

Source: Charges
INTRAORAL PROCEDURES

PI

$572.00

474.10

$572.00
11.00

i rans. Date:11/1/2004
Interest

Trans. Seq. #: 107253

Item #: -1

Source: Adjustment - PATIENT

FINANCE Amt:

$4.60

>ans. Date:12/l/2004
Interest

Trans. Seq. #: 115577

Item #: -1

Source: Adjustment - PATIENT

FINANCE Amt:

$3.70

rans. Date:l/l/2005
Interest

Trans. Seq. #: 123499

Item #: -1

Source: Adjustment - PATIENT

FINANCE Amt:

"rans. Date2/l/2005
Interest

Trans. Seq. #: 133259

Item ± -1

Source: Adjustment - PATIENT

FINANCE Amt:

$3.94

tans. DateS/1/2005
Interest

Trans. Seq. 4: 141287

Item #: -1

Source: Adjustment - PATIENT

FINANCE Amt:

.61

-ans. Date:4/l/2005
mterest

Trans. Seq. ?: 150429

Item #: -1

Source: Adjustment - PATIENT

FINANCE Amt:

$4.05

ans. Datef/1/2005
nterest

Trans. Seq. #: 159975

Item ± -1

Source: Adjustment - PATIENT

FINANCE Amt:

$3.98

ans. Date:6/l/2005
iterest

Trans. Seq. #: 169446

Item #: -1

Source: Adjustment - PATIENT

FINANCE Amt:

$4.18

ins. Date:7/l/2005
iterest

Trans. Seq. #: 178040

Item #: -1

FINANCE Amt:

$4.10

Source: Adjustment - PATIENT

ms. Date:7/28/2005
Trans. Seq. #: 186218
Item #: 1 Source: Payment - PATIENT
PRI INS Amt:
LTIUS PAID YOU $514.80 ON 2/25/05. PAYMENT IN FULL IS DUE IMMEDIATELY. ALTIUS IS RETRACTING THE
\YMENT MADE TO US. PLEASE CONTACT US IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS. THANK YOU!

$0.00

ns. Date:7/31/2005
Trans. Seq. #: 187320
31/05 REFUND ALTIUS CK 5254

item #: 1 Source: Payment - UNITED UNITED2

R

Amt:

$334.62

is. DateS/1/2005
erest

Item #: -1

FINANCE Amt:

$9.42

Trans. Seq. #: 188026

is. Date9/l/2005
Trans. Seq. rf: 195723
E-COLLECT LETTER SENT
s. DateS/1/2005
Test

Trans. Seq. #: 195906

Item #: -I

Source: Adjustment - PATIENT

Source:

PC

Source: Adjustment - PATIENT

FINANCE Amt:

Amt:

$9.56

11/1/2005

InterWest Anesthesia Associates
274 N Main St
Logan, UT 84321-3915 USA
Patient Ledger Analytic

IT
nit. Bal: S 0.00

Active Charges Only

HEATHER
Ins. Bal: $ 0.00

pful^rT0'644
Pat. Bal: £952.71

Trans. Datetf/10/2004
Trans. Seq. #: 67551
Primary Generated. OutputType: PRINTED

Daceof

3 i n h : 9/16/1993
Phone- (435)512 i « ,
Total Bal: $952.71
SSN:
t^5> 512-1821

Source: 1st Carrier Claim Generated: ALTIl

Amt:

Trans. Date:7/12/2004
Trans. Seq. #: 77896
ALTIUS PAYMENTS 6602981

Item ft 1 Source: Payment-ALTIUS ALTIUS

PRI INS Amt:

Trans. DateS/1/2004
Interest

Trans. Seq. #: 89602

Itemft.1 Source: Adjustment - PATIENT

FINANCE Amt:

Trans. Daterl 0/1/2004
Interest

Trans. Seq. #: 99069

Itemft-1

FINANCE Amt:

Charge Seq. #:

212,619

Primary:

Charge Amount: $ 317.57

P. Status:

Source: Adjustment - PATIENT

($334.62

$7.26

$0.84

Secondary:
Item# From

Jo

POS CPT#

S. Status:
Procedure Description

Charge Balance: S317.57
Trans. Daterl 1/1/2005

Trans. Seq. #: 212619

11/1/2005 11/1/2005 22 COLL

Attending Physician: JRR

Trans. Date 11/1/200

Mod ICD#

Charges Days or Units

Source: Charges
ACCOUNT TO COLLECTIONS

Amt:
$317.57

$317.57
1.00

